Syria and the Long Shadow of Sectarian Violence
The Levant, also sometimes referred to as Greater Syria, could be called a rich tapestry of ethnic and religious diversity. Various Christian sects, Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, Druze, and Alawites all call the region home as do Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, and Circassians. Until the last century, even a significant number of Jews called its urban centers home. Instead the region is more often portrayed as a simmering cauldron of ethnic and religious tensions, blood feuds, and sectarian hatreds frequently boiling over into massacres, killings, and discrimination. When reporting on sectarian violence, like the recent events in Syria, the media often resorts to simplistic narratives of sectarian violence that often place the causes in primordial hatreds of difference. On a very surface level sectarian violence is easy to explain, but its root causes are often more convoluted and complex than they appear.
At its core sectarian violence is caused by the breakdown of social trust and the erosion or collapse of institutional authority. In general this has less to do with religion and more to do with politics, economics, and perceptions of the social order. Any Syrian can name Sunnis who benefited from the Assad regime and participated in the regime’s repression of their co-religionists just as any Iraqi could do the same with Shi’a under Saddam’s rule. In order to better understand how social breakdown contributes to outbreaks of sectarian violence I would like to look at two prominent cases: 1) the sectarian riots in Aleppo in 1850 and 2) the 1860 Druze-Christian war in Mount Lebanon.
Background
These two events of sectarian bloodletting are distinct and should be viewed within the local context that they occurred, however the Levant experienced a series of broad shocks that disrupted the traditional political and social order in the wider region. The first being the strength of European powers (most notably Britain, France, and Russia) in relation to the Ottoman government contributed to growing European commercial and political influence within the Levant. European powers often lobbied the Ottoman government on behalf of Christians within the empire or chose to unilaterally intervene when it suited their interests.
In reaction to its military and economic weakness compared to its European rivals and allies, the Ottoman Sultans initiated a series of sweeping reforms that touched just about every corner of Ottoman society. The first of these reforms was Sultan Mahmud II’s decision to abolish the Janissary Corps in 1826 and replace it with a new army based on conscription. In 1839 Sultan Abdulmejid decreed that all Ottoman subjects were equal regardless of religion or ethnicity. In 1856 the Sultan added legal protections for property rights and new tax reforms that combined with the 1839 reforms to be known as the tanzimat. While the implementation of the reforms were uneven and haphazard at times, they contributed to uncertainties throughout the empire and helped fuel new rivalries.
Another trend experienced across the empire and felt specifically in the Levant was internal revolts. In the 1820s, Greeks, aided by Europeans, won their independence from the empire. More relevant to the Levant is the renegade governor of Ottoman Egypt, Mehmet Ali. In 1833, Mehmet Ali’s forces invaded and occupied the Ottoman provinces of Syria and occupied it until 1840. Under the leadership of Ibrahim Pasha, Mehmet Ali’s son, the Egyptian military sought to weaken local leaders and bring Syria under the more centralized government in Cairo. This contributed the weakening power of elites within Syria.
The 1850 Events in Aleppo
As the Islamic holiday of Eid al-Adha approached in October 1850 rumors of an impending implementation of military conscription spread throughout the Ottoman city of Aleppo. The rumors followed a government census, the first ever of the adult male population, and fueled speculation throughout sectors of the community. On 17 October, Muslims from the city’s eastern quarters affiliated with the janissary corps, a once elite unit of the Ottoman military abolished in 1826, marched to the governor’s palace to express their grievances where they were refused an audience. The group later marched to the home of one of the city’s prominent notables (‘ayan) Abdullah al-Babinsi who also refused to meet with them.
Twice rejected the mob turned their toward the predominantly Christian neighborhoods of Judaydah and Salibah. The rioters ransacked churches, shops, and homes for two days killing at least 20 Christians and wounding dozens more. Many of the Judaydah’s and Salibah’s Christians fled to the safety of other neighborhoods as the pillaging was generally confined to the aforementioned areas of the city. After the rioting subsided, a state of relative disorder remained throughout the city. The rioters blamed their actions on the Christians, who according to the rioters, had transgressed the acceptable limits of behavior (for such acts as dressing like Muslims, riding horses, owning black slaves, ringing church bells, etc.). On 2 NOV Ottoman troops arrived in the city and put down the rebellion with extreme prejudice.
European consuls and merchants in Aleppo at the time generally attributed the violence to religious bigotry while Muslim sources blamed outside agitators and political rivalries in the city. However on closer scrutiny, modern historians have recorded a more complex story. The targeted communities of Judaydah and Salibah were home to Uniate Christians who had increasingly adopted European tastes. American historian Bruce Masters noted that their “Westernization went beyond superficial cultural manifestations to include political allegiances as well. Thus, when rumors reached Aleppo, reporting victories of Russian or Greek armies over the Ottomans, there was joy in Judayda and consternation in the rest of the city.” It is worth noting that Aleppo’s other Christian communities were left unscathed during the rioting. Master’s elaborates further on the possible causes of the outbreak of sectarian violence.
“Both rioters and victims were individuals who were experiencing a devolution in their traditional corporate communal bonds to the larger community. But the inhabitants of Judayda, unlike the inhabitants of the eastern quarters, had voluntarily chosen to disassociate themselves from the city's tradition of brokered politics. They had first asserted their independence by aligning themselves with Rome, becoming Uniates. Forsaking their ancestral Greek and Syrian Orthodox hierarchies and forging client relationships not with the established Sunni burghers of the city but with Europeans, they had perhaps unintentionally destroyed the civic bonds that had connected them with their neighbor.” - Bruce Masters in “The 1850 Events in Aleppo: An Aftershock of Syria’s Incorporation into the Capitalist World System,” International Journal of Middle East Studies
The 1860 Mount Lebanon War
Probably the most well-known outbreak of sectarian violence in the 19th century is the Mount Lebanon War of 1860. In the decades leading up to the war, a series of events contributed to the political volatility in Mount Lebanon. Ibrahim Pasha’s invasion and Egyptian-rule, the Tanzimat reforms, the arrival of Protestant missionaries and European economic penetration, etc. concomitantly disrupted the traditional social, religious, political, and economic boundaries that had prevailed in Mount Lebanon for centuries. In the late spring of 1860, Mount Lebanon descended into chaos as factions of Druze and Maronite Christians engaged in a brutal sectarian war that would leave thousands dead.
At the time, European diplomats blamed the violence deep-seeded sectarian animosities and atavistic blood feuds. This position was generally taken at face value for much of the 20th century. More recently however, historians have challenged this notion. Prominent names such as Eugene Rogan and Ussama Makdisi have posited that the events are better framed in social and economic terms. Makdisi in particular argued:
“Rank rather than religion was the all-important marker of elite status in rural Mount Lebanon. Family alliances occurred across religious lines, creating alternate kinships that transcended difference of faith. . . It is not surprising, then, that Christian and Druze notables took an oath of allegiance at the shrine of the Virgin Mary, that one loyal Shi’i emir was buried in the Sunni Shihab family cemetery and that a Christian merchant funded the construction of a mosque.” - Ussama Makdisi in The Culture of Sectarianism
Makdisi argues further that the source of the violence lies in the breakdown of feudal authority of Mount Lebanon due to challenges from commoners motivated by the Tanzimat reforms. Two years before the war, a young Maronite muleteer named Tanyus Shahin led a revolt against his Maronite feudal lords in Kisrawan. The rhetoric of their revolt in someways mirrored the language of the Tanzimat insisting on equality and freedom. Further Makdisi asserts, “much to the elites' surprise, Shahin offered yet another interpretation of the Tanzimat in Mount Lebanon, for he understood reform as a legitimization of Christian communal rights, and hence as a mandate for popular participation in politics.”
As Shahin’s ideas spread throughout Mount Lebanon, Maronite youth in communally mixed areas, used Shahin’s rhetoric to challenge the power of their Druze feudal lords. Despite their attempts, Maronite elites were unable to restrain Shahin and his followers contributing to the fracturing of Mount Lebanon’s elites and collapse of communal authority. As Shahin’s populist revolt spread it took on sectarian overtones and descended into the chaos of war.
In the Context of Modern Syria
In the ashes of WWI, the European powers mandated the creation of the modern borders of Syria at San Remo (inspired by Sykes-Picot). During the interwar period, the flames of Arab nationalism spread throughout Syria as its citizens strived for independence from France. For many of Syria’s minorities, nationalism provided an appealing vision for the country with promises equal standing in the eyes of the state. After independence in 1946, nationalist politics in Syria proved quite destabilizing. Between 1949-1966, Syria witnessed eight military coups.
During the early years of the state, Druze and Alawite Syrians from the country’s underdeveloped rural hinterlands joined the military in large numbers. Adopting the politics of various flavors of Arab nationalism, these minorities were at the forefront of Syria’s tumultuous politics. In 1966, three Alawite officer spearheaded a coup that brought them to power. Under the leadership of Hafez al-Assad, the government privileged the Alawites (its important to note that many Alawites were victim to Assad’s brutality as well).
The first major challenges to Assad’s rule came from Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood, who branded the Alawites as heretics. Assad’s government responded to the Brotherhood’s threats and attacks through collective punishment of Sunni communities. The best known example of this was his decimation of the city of Hama in 1982.
As the country descended into civil war in 2012, many revolutionaries called for sectarian unity and freedom for all Syrians. Despite their best efforts, fear often overcame hope contributing to various waves of sectarian violence. The Assad government’s propaganda claimed the fall of the regime would be a disaster for the country’s minorities. The rise of groups like ISIS provided the Assad regime with plenty of fodder.
Sectarian violence is likely part of Syria’s near future, but it isn’t inevitable in Syria. Rebuilding communal trust is a long and harrowing road strewn with obstacles, but it can be done. If Ahmad Sharaa wishes to build something more permanent and successful than his predecessor, he’ll need to build institutions that represent Syrians from all religious and ethnic backgrounds.
