A Fragile Truce
On Wednesday, the Israeli government and Hamas announced that they had agreed to terms for a ceasefire ending fourteen months of hostilities that have left tens of thousands dead and even more homeless in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages. According to the terms of the agreement, the ceasefire and hostage release will begin Sunday. Several questions remain unanswered, the biggest being, will the agreement hold?
The news of a ceasefire and hostage release is long overdue and should be celebrated as good news. The Israeli hostages and civilians in Gaza have endured almost incalculable suffering over the past fourteen months and it is criminal that it has taken this long to come to a resolution. However, before we get carried away in celebrations, we should be cautious due to the tenuous nature of the deal. The next four days will provide ample opportunity for this deal to unravel and there are definitely those who will seek to undermine it in hopes of continuing the war. Even if this deal makes it to Sunday, I believe there is a strong possibility of this deal falling apart over the next several months. It should be remembered that the Gaza wars of 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021 all ended with deals that eventually fell apart for a variety of factors.
Netanyahu’s Predicament
The Israeli cabinet is expected to ratify the deal on Thursday, but not without opposition from its hardliners. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has already threatened to quit the current government if fighting doesn’t resume after the first phase of the deal (a 42 day cease-fire and hostage release). Itamar Ben Givr, the Israeli National Security Minister and vocal advocate of “Greater Israel”, has boasted in recent days about his success in thwarting previous deals that would have brought hostages home and has encouraged Smotrich to join him in torpedoing the current deal. These are two of the most extreme voices in the cabinet and do not likely represent the prevailing view of the cabinet, but with razor thin margins keeping Netanyahu in power, every dissenting voice has an outsized influence. Netanyahu has already spun the deal as a product of his hardline approach with Hamas while distancing himself from a long-term commitment to a cease-fire, likely trying to portray the deal as more palatable for the government’s hardliners.
The Israeli opposition celebrated the news of the deal while criticizing Netanyahu claiming the current deal is roughly the same deal that has been on the table since last May and that his intransigence has only led to more hostage deaths (not to mention Palestinian suffering). For much of the last year, Netanyahu has prosecuted the war in Gaza on the grounds of dismantling Hamas and permanently removing it from Israel’s borders. While the campaign has decapitated the group’s leadership and left the group severely battered, the group still maintains its grip on the territory. In a speech at the Washington-based Atlantic Council, U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken recently stated that Hamas has filled its ranks with new recruits nearly meeting its pre-war numbers. This matches with warnings from counter-terrorism experts and Israeli military leaders who insisted early on that the destruction of Hamas was an impossible goal. Netanyahu’s critics have also accused him of continuing the war to preserve his hold on the Israeli premiership. In some respects, Netanyahu has pinned his political career on this war and while it has not been globally popular, Israeli Jews generally viewed his handling of the conflict favorably leading to a bump in his approval rating over the past year.
Over his nearly 45 years in Israeli politics, Netanyahu has proved himself adept at positioning himself in or near the centers of power. His dominance of Israeli politics over the past sixteen years have coincided with the Israeli publics dramatic shift to the political right. While Netanyahu is an extremely divisive figure in Israeli politics, he’s built his most recently alliances with the far right who generally support various annexationist policies, some including Gaza. In general, Israelis are exhausted by the war and feel that it is past time to bring the hostages home, however large elements of Netanyahu’s base, especially those in the settler movement, see the current situation as a time to press Israel’s advantage. Some of these supporters even hope for Israel’s resettlement of Gaza. Netanyahu’s political survival will likely depend on finding a way to mollify those in his base who currently oppose a ceasefire. In order to do this Netanyahu will have to deliver something in return for this community, this could include settlement expansion in the West Bank, annexation of portions of the West Bank, or influencing the U.S. to repeal sanctions on the most violent settlers. Any of these actions could trigger a response from Hamas or other militant groups that would undermine any longterm ceasefire.
Hamas and its Rivals
Over the past year Israel’s offensive has dramatically weakened Hamas and left much of its long-tenured leaders dead. For the past two decades, the organization’s hardliners, like Yahya Sinwar and Mohamed Deif, strengthened their grip on the organization’s leadership at the expense of more pragmatic members. There is still so much we don’t know about the philosophical outlook of the group’s new generation of leaders. How committed are they to peace? Will they maintain relations with Iran and its proxies? What is their relationship with the Palestinian Authority? These are just a few of many questions that will need to be answered if we are going to have any confidence in the current deal. Perhaps a more pressing question, is what is the relationship between the new Hamas leadership and its rival militant groups in Gaza.
Like any political movement or party, Hamas has had to compete for support and new recruits with a collection of groups. Its best-known rival is Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) which has remained firmly committed to armed resistance since the 1980s. At times PIJ has been one of Hamas’ strongest allies, particularly when they both rejected the Oslo Accords and sought to undermine them during the 1990s. While Hamas has at times signaled its willingness soften its stance toward Israel, PIJ has not. PIJ also has maintained ties to Iran and is capable or carrying out attacks against Israel (rocket attacks, suicide bombings, etc.) . If the leadership of PIJ is not on the same page as Hamas regarding the current deal, they likely have the capacity to torpedo a deal through the renewal of hostilities. It is also worth mentioning that PIJ maintains custody of an unknown number of hostages.
While the finer details of the second and third phases of the cease-fire are still being negotiated, it is unlikely that a Netanyahu government will agree to terms to any deal that allows Hamas and its allies to continue to maintain their control of Gaza unfettered. Earlier negotiations proposed creating a peacekeeping force, possibly comprised of/or supervised by Arab states with relatively positive relations with Israel. This may be palatable to Israel, but would Hamas agree to the terms of a deal that would ultimately strip them of control in Gaza? That scenario is hard to imagine. However, it likely that popular support for Hamas in Gaza is at or near all-time lows after the historic destruction of Gaza. Could the collapse of Hamas’ popularity in Gaza force its hand in negotiations? That is a difficult question to answer and one that I can’t answer, but Hamas has been willing to use violence against Palestinians in its pursuit of power before. Perhaps carrots, such as conditioning humanitarian aid and reconstruction financing could sway Hamas and its allies to cede some of their control of Gaza.
The U.S. and the Arab States
By most accounts, the breakthrough in negotiations has less to do with a change of terms and more to do with the incoming Trump administration’s willingness to play hardball with Israel. For months, analysts had speculated that Netanyahu was waiting for a second Trump term and more staunchly pro-Israel policy toward Gaza (however I’m not sure you can get much more favorable than the Biden administration). Last week, Trump supposedly told both parties that there would be “hell to pay” if the hostages weren’t released by 20 January. Netanyahu likely wishes to remain in Trump’s good graces and took his threat seriously.
In its current state, Israel would be unable to carry out its war in Gaza without the significant military aid provided by the U.S. and while the Biden administration at times threatened to suspend specific aid to Israel, it never followed through on its threats. In many respects the Trump administration is a wildcard. While much of Trump’s base is adamantly pro-Israel, there is also a strong isolationist wing in the Republican Party that sees all foreign military aid as a waste of U.S. tax dollars and unnecessarily involving the U.S. in foreign conflicts. Trump and his family have also built strong business relations with the Gulf Arab states. Given the wealth and resources of the Saudis and Emiratis, Trump has plenty of incentives to maintain positive relations with the Arab states. One means of doing this is holding a harder line against some of Israel’s more destructive impulses, like West Bank annexation or occupying more Syrian territory.
Another angle that is being reported in some circles is that Trump has told Israeli officials that he will look the other way if Israel decides to violate the agreement after the hostages have been freed. I’m skeptical of such an arrangement as it does appear that Trump wants to focus on domestic issues and doesn’t want the distraction of another round of conflict. However, Trump is generally transactional in nature and Netanyahu may see granting Trump a win before he’s even in office as a means in gaining his favor in a second round of fighting should both parties be unable to agree to the terms of a second or third phase.
The Enemy of the Good
The current details of the upcoming ceasefire are far from perfect and there are reasons to question whether or not it will even make it phase one. However, given the history of Palestinians and Israelis, there was never going to be a perfect, or even great, deal. All sides, Israelis, Palestinians, and mediators, should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Any deal that brings the hostages homes and ends the past year of war and suffering is a good one. Any deal that ends Israel’s brutal torment of Gaza’s civilian population is a good one. This deal and the fragile truce it hopes to produce is far from perfect, but it is at least good. If this ceasefire is going to survive beyond the coming days and weeks ahead, it will require continued attention and pressure of the U.S. and friendly Arab states and their use of carrots and sticks to keep both parties in line. I believe that a long-term truce and an eventual political settlement is in the best interests of all parties involved, but those goals remain a long way off. In the meantime, the best way to work toward the more lofty goals of mutual recognition and peace is to endorse positions that weaken the extremes in Palestinian and Israeli societies while empowering moderates. This can only be done through building trust between Israelis and Palestinians, which is much easier said than done, but it is worth trying.
